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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from an interlocutory order suppressing evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The State has adequately identified the statutes and constitutional
provisions of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue. Did the trial court correctly rule that the independent source
doctrine did not apply because officers violated the knock-and-announce
statute without justification, the evidence was seized by the State and there
could never be a source for the evidence independent of the prior illegality?
Mr. Zesiger agrees with the preservation of the issue and standard of
review set forth by the State. See State's Brief at 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In addition to the case history outlined by the State, this Court should be
aware of the following:
As a result of the violation of the knock-and-announce statute during the
service of the first search warrant, the trial court suppressed the computer
equipment seized as well as written and oral statements made by Mr. Zesiger
during the execution of the first search warrant. R. 167-78 (State's Addendum
B). The only evidence at issue in the execution of the second search warrant

is the computer equipment that was momentarily returned to Mr. Zesiger and
then immediately re-seized pursuant to the second search warrant. R. 255,
V 3 (State's Addendum D).
After the computer was seized pursuant to the first search warrant, its
contents were searched, copied and examined by the State. R. 268:18-19.
The first search warrant was authorized by Judge Clint S. Judkins of the
First District Court on December 10,1999. R. 14-15. Judge Judkins was also
the judge who granted the motion to suppress. R. 167-69. The affidavit in
support of the second search warrant was presented to a different judge on
November 30, 2001, Judge Jeffrey R. Burbank. R. 179; see also Findings,
Second Motion to Suppress, R. 254 ^ 11.
Finally, the trial court ruled that that the independent source doctrine did
not apply in this case for two specific reasons. First, because "the illegal taint
on the evidence was not removed by the subsequent service of the Second
Search Warrant." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting
Second Motion to Suppress, R. 255 ^ 2. Second, the trial court also concluded
that the independent source doctrine should not be applied to violations of the
knock-and-announce statute. Id. at ]f 3.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State conceded to Mr. Zesiger's first Motion to Suppress before the
trial court. The State specifically conceded that the computer equipment was
seized and Mr. Zesiger's written and oral statements were obtained in violation
of Utah's knock-and-announce statute. The State also conceded to exclusion
of the evidence. The application of the exclusionary rule to the first search
warrant has not been appealed and is not before this Court.
The execution of the second search warrant does not remedy the initial
constitutional violation. The evidence seized by the State during the execution
of the first search warrant is tainted by the prior illegality. The State seeks to
expand the scope of the independent source doctrine in this case. However,
the independent source doctrine requires that the State demonstrate that the
later, lawful seizure be genuinely independent of the prior illegal seizure. The
State cannot do so in this case because evidence was unlawfully seized,
searched and retained. Momentarily returning the computer equipment to Mr.
Zesiger and then immediately re-seizing the computer does attenuate the
illegal taint on the evidence. The trial court correctly ruled that the independent
source doctrine does not apply to this case.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

f

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
EXECUTION OF THE SECOND SEARCH WARRANT DOES
NOT REMEDY THE TAINT ON THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM
MR. ZESIGER IN VIOLATION OF UTAH'S KNOCK-ANDANNOUNCE STATUTE.
A.

The State has Not Challenged the Trial Court's First
Suppression Order.

The State conceded before the trial court that the evidence seized during
the execution of the first search warrant was obtained in violation of Utah's
knock-and-announce statute. See State's Concession to Defendant's Motion
to Suppress, R. 161-162 ^ 4 (Addendum A). The State also conceded to
suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the violation. Id. The Order
granting Mr. Zesiger's Motion to Suppress regarding the execution of the first
search warrant was not appealed by the State and is not before this Court.1
B.

The State Has Conceded that Officers
Violated Utah's Knock-and-Announce
Statute Without Justification When
Executing the First Search Warrant.

When police officers execute a search warrant, they must ordinarily
provide notice of their authority and purpose before entering the premises they
intend to search. State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). This rule is
1

The State indicates in its Brief that "it appears that suppression in the first
instance was inappropriate." State's Brief at 23. This ruling was not appealed
4

commonly referred to as the "knock-and-announce" requirement. This rule has
longstanding history in the United States and has origins in England from
almost four hundred years ago. Id. This rule serves to protect a number of
interests, specifically, (1) the protection of the privacy of an individual in his or
her home, (2) the prevention of violence that could result in an unannounced
entry into a private home, (3) the prevention of damage to the physical
structures that can occur with forced entry. Id. (citing Payne v. United States,
508 F.2d 1391,1939-94 (5th Cir. 1975); other citations omitted).
The Utah Legislature has codified this longstanding requirement in Utah
Code Ann. §77-23-210. Utah's knock-and-announce statute provides:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any
building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer
executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
(1)

If, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness . . . .

(emphasis added). Utah is one of thirty-three states that have adopted
statutes that require that law enforcement provide notice prior to entry. See
Mark Josephson, Note, Fourth Amendment - Must Police Knock and
Announce Themselves Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 1229,1239 (1996) (citations omitted).
This Court addressed violation of Utah's knock-and-announce statute in

by the State and is beyond the scope of this appeal.
5

State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Ribe, officers were
serving a knock-and-announce search warrant. When they approached the
residence of the defendant, they observed the defendant outside his front door
and saw him flee the scene. Id. at 404. While some officers pursued the
defendant, another officer approached the residence, opened the closed storm
door, yelled "police" and ran into the home. The officer did not knock on the
door and wait for someone to answer the door. Id. This Court held that this
unjustified violation of the knock-and-announce statute warranted suppression
of the evidence that was seized. Id. at 415.2
In Mr. Zesiger's case, officers obtained a knock-and-announce warrant.
R. 14. Mr. Zesiger lived in a dorm apartment at Utah State University. The
apartment contained three subapartments. Officers failed to knock and
announce themselves at the door to subapartment 306(ef) occupied by Mr.
Zesiger. R. 159 ffij 6, 7,11,12. The State did not assert exigent
circumstances to justify the violation. Ultimately, the State conceded that this
conduct violated the knock-and-announce statute and conceded to
suppression of the evidence in this matter. R. 161-62 (Addendum A). There
was no justification for the violation of the knock-and-announce statute. The
2

The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a knock-and-announce violation
occurs when no one is at home, suppression of the evidence is not warranted.
State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988). There is no dispute in the
instant case that Mr. Zesiger was in his dorm room when the first search
6

trial court correctly excluded all evidence seized as a result of the violation.
C.

The Independent Source Doctrine Does Not
Apply to Violations of the Knock-and-Announce Statute
When Law Enforcement has Seized Evidence During
the Unlawful Search.

The independent source doctrine does not apply in situations where
officers have unlawfully seized and searched evidence in violation of the
knock-and-announce requirement and then a second search warrant is
obtained and executed. The typical application of the independent source
doctrine has been in situations where law enforcement has made an illegal
entry, but has not seized the evidence that is ultimately seized with a valid
search warrant. The cases cited by the State do not support the application of
the independent source doctrine in this matter.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the government from introducing
evidence that has been obtained as a result of an unlawful search. Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914)). The rule also extends to evidence that is "the product of the
primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the
unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful
search becomes 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Murray, 487 U.S. at
537 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)); see also

warrant was executed. R. 269: 9-10.
7

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484-85 (1963).
The independent source doctrine provides an exception to the
exclusionary rule. The rule provides that the government will be permitted to
introduce challenged evidence if the government can demonstrate that a
subsequent lawful seizure is "genuinely independent" of a prior illegal search.
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). The United States
Supreme Court has held that application of the doctrine is warranted when the
government has made an unlawful entry, but has not seized evidence until a
search warrant is obtained.
For example, in the case of Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533
(1988) officers had evidence that there was marijuana in a warehouse. The
officers illegally entered the warehouse, observed marijuana, and then left to
get a warrant. The officers did not include any information they obtained as a
result of the illegal entry to get the search warrant. Id. 535-36. The search
warrant was ultimately executed and the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was admissible because the
subsequent search warrant relied upon independent evidence, not the
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry. The officers did not seize
any evidence during the illegal entry.
The United States Supreme Court makes specific mention of the
potential problem when property is actually seized and kept in police custody:
8

So long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an
earlier, tainted one {which may well be difficult to establish where
the seized goods are kept in the police's possession) there is no
reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.
Id. at 542 (emphasis added). See also Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 799-801 (1984) (after initial illegal entry, no items were seized
or searched, agents waited in apartment until search warrant obtained,
United States Supreme Court held that independent source doctrine
applied to all items ultimately seized and searched pursuant to the valid
warrant). The dicta contained in Murray is instructive in this case..
There is no mechanism by which the second seizure of the
computer in this case can be "genuinely independent" of the first tainted
search. The evidence was actually seized, search and taken into police
custody as a result of the constitutional violation.
This Court addressed the independent source doctrine in State v.
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Northrup, officers
made an illegal entry into the Defendant's home. While in the home,
they observed contraband in plain view. However, nothing was
confiscated and the home was not searched until a search warrant
arrived hours later. Id. at 1290. As in the United States Supreme Court
cases, this Court emphasized that although there was an illegal entry,
there was no seizure of any evidence:

9

[T]he evidence was not disturbed or confiscated until the warrant
arrived. Even though the officers saw the evidence, no
meaningful interference with Northrup's property interest occurred
until the evidence was confiscated after the arrival of the warrant.
Id. at 1294 (emphasis added). The opinion states that evidence is seized
"when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109,113 (1984)). Again, as in the United States Supreme Court cases, of
central importance in the application of the independent source doctrine is the
fact that officers do not actually seize the evidence until after a valid warrant is
obtained.
When a knock-and-announce violation occurs in the execution of a
warrant and evidence is seized as a result, as in Mr. Zesiger's case, the taint
from that illegality cannot be remedied by the State. By contrast, if a knockand-announce violation occurs, and evidence is not seized, and an
independent and lawful search takes place, the doctrine may apply.3 For
example, in State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 259 (Kan. 2000), the Kansas Supreme
Court addressed the issue of application of the independent source doctrine to
3

Other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected the application of the independent
source doctrine in knock-and-announce violation cases involving one search.
See e.g., United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1993) (in a case
involving one search in violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the court
rejected the application of the independent source doctrine and stated it render
the knock and announce rule "meaningless since an officer could obviate legal
entry in every instance simply by looking to the information used to obtain the

10

knock-and-announce violations when evidence is not seized as a result of the
violation. Shivley involves the service of two search warrants. In the
execution of the first warrant, officers simply battered down two doors to the
residence. Id. at 260-61. An officer was killed by the Defendant who testified
that he thought someone was breaking into his home. The court held that the
first search warrant was served in violation of the principle of announcement
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 263.
As in Murray and Northrup, officers did not seize any items from the
residence but sealed off the residence and then obtained a second search
warrant. Shivley, 999 P.2d at 261. The Kansas Supreme Court held that:
the second search was held to be constitutionally sufficient
because no physical items were seized under the initial search
warrant and because the second search warrant was based in
substantial part on the first affidavit and did not rely on any
additional information obtained in the first raid as to Shively's drug
activity.
Shively, 999 P.2d at 264 (emphasis added). Of central importance to
the court in application of the independent source doctrine was the fact
that no evidence was actually seized by the government until after the
service of the second search warrant.4

warrant").
4
It should also be noted that in Shively the court noted that the "same judge
who found probable cause to issue the first warrant to search for drug-related
evidence issued the second search warrant as well." 999 P.2d at 264-65. In
Mr. Zesiger's case, Judge Judkins issued the first search warrant (R. 14-15)

11

In all of the cases cited supra, whether the violation was a
warrantless entry or a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the
government did not seize evidence until a valid warrant was in place. In
such an instance, courts have held that the later, lawful search could be
genuinely independent of the prior illegality. The same cannot be said in
Mr. Zesiger's case. In this matter, the State conceded that the computer
was illegally seized on December 13, 2001. R. 167-68. The computer
equipment was seized, searched and retained by the State after the
unlawful execution of the first search warrant. On November 30, 2002,
the equipment was momentarily returned to Mr. Zesiger and then "reseized" pursuant to the second search warrant. R. 254-55, ffl[ 10-13.
The State's actions do not alter the taint on the computer equipment
evidence from the prior illegality.5 Once evidence is illegally seized, the
independent source doctrine does not apply.

and ordered the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the knockand-announce violation. R. 167-69. The application for the second search
warrant was presented to a different Judge, Judge Jeffrey R. Burbank. R. 179;
see also Findings Re Second Motion to Suppress, R. 254, % 11.
5
In the event that this Court were to apply the independent source doctrine to
the computer evidence re-seized pursuant to the second search warrant, Mr.
Zesiger asserts that his oral and written statements obtained during the
unlawful execution of the first search warrant should remain excluded. There
is no basis for the State to claim an independent source for the statements,
obtained from Mr. Zesiger during the execution of the first warrant.
12

CONCLUSION
The State conceded before the trial court that officers violated the knockand-announce statute in executing the first search warrant. The trial court
correctly concluded that simply serving a second search warrant and re-seizing
the evidence unlawfully obtained does not remedy the previous constitutional
violation. Once the computer equipment evidence was taken into State
custody, there was no mechanism by which the State could attenuate the taint
of the prior illegality. Mr. Zesiger respectfully urges this Court to affirm the trial
court's Order suppressing the computer re-seized with the second search
warrant.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The Defendant joins in the State's request for oral argument.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of | L ^ 1 , 2002.
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, L.L.C.

Attorneys for Tyler John Zesiger
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Scott LWyatt #5829
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
11 West 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 716-8361
Facsimile: (435) 716-8381

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

n'";-1

Tj1

SEP "^

STATE'S CONCESSION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRES S AND REQUEST FOR
JURY TRIAL SETTING
Case No. 991100886

TYLER JOHN ZESIGER,
Judge Clint S. Judkins
Defendant.
COMES NOW, the State of Utah, by and through Scott L Wyatt, the Cache County
Attorney, and hereby concedes to the court granting the defendant's Motion to Suppress; requests
a trial setting and in support of the same represents to the court as follows:
1.

The Defendant filed a motion to suppress based on the investigators' failure to

follow the state knock and announce statutory requirements. The state filed its response
objecting to the motion.
2.

The court set oral argument on the motion on June 27, 2001, and the parties

appeared and presented there relative positions. During the argument the court indicated that it
would rule in favor of the defendant unless the state could provide case law to the contrary. Both
parties were invited to engage in further research and present further memoranda on the matter.
3.

The defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion

to Suppress.
4.

The state is still unable to find any case law on point to present to the court.

Based on the court's statements, made on June 27, 2001, referred to above in paragraph "2" the

<k\

state submits this matter and concedes to the court's granting of the defendant's motion on
grounds that the state's investigators failed to comply with the knock-and-announce statute.
5.

With the motion to suppress resolved the state respectfully requests a trial setting

so this matter may come to a final resolution.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2001.
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY

